Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History of Fugitive Slave Rendition by Schmitt, Jeffrey M.
University of Dayton
eCommons
School of Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2016
Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from
the History of Fugitive Slave Rendition
Jeffrey M. Schmitt
University of Dayton, jschmitt1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub
Part of the President/Executive Department Commons, and the State and Local Government
Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in School of Law Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Schmitt, Jeffrey M., "Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History of Fugitive Slave Rendition" (2016). School of Law
Faculty Publications. 31.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/law_fac_pub/31
	  1 
Immigration Enforcement Reform: Learning from the History of 
Fugitive Slave Rendition 
 
JEFFREY M. SCHMITT* 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States deports hundreds of thousands of immigrants each year,1 leaving many of 
the country’s eleven million undocumented immigrants living in constant fear of being torn from 
their families and homes. Because Congress has been unable to address this humanitarian crisis 
with meaningful legislative reform, President Obama recently announced that his administration 
will consider changes to its enforcement policy.2 By drawing a parallel to the nation’s experience 
with fugitive slave rendition, this Essay argues that President Obama should allow the states to 
work with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to moderate the implementation of 
federal enforcement programs. 
ICE’s Secure Communities program, which seeks to target dangerous criminals for 
immigration enforcement,3 has generated controversy in part because it operates without input 
from the states. Because most criminals are prosecuted by state governments, this program 
necessarily relies on state cooperation to identify and detain undocumented criminals. Many 
states and localities, however, are concerned that the Secured Communities program encourages 
racial profiling and discourages immigrants from reporting crimes and cooperating with the 
police.4 They have therefore sought to stop sharing information with ICE and have ended routine 
compliance with federal requests to hold individuals who have been targeted for immigration 
enforcement.5 
This story of state noncooperation closely parallels the nation’s experience with the federal 
Fugitive Slave Act. This Act was unpopular in many northern states that wished to provide 
protection for free-black residents who were being kidnapped under the guise of fugitive slave 
rendition. Many states therefore passed personal liberty laws that prohibited state officers from 
aiding in enforcement and forbade the use of state jails to hold persons claimed as fugitives. 
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1 U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2013 ICE IMMIGRATION 
REMOVALS: ERO ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/2013-ice-
immigration-removals.pdf.   
2 David Nakamura, Under Pressure, Obama Calls for Immigration-Enforcement Review, WASH. POST (March 13, 
2014, 10:49PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2014/03/13/under-pressure-obama-calls-
for-immigration-enforcement-review/.  
3 Approximately 20% of all immigration removals take place under Secure Communities. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-708, SECURE COMMUNITIES: CRIMINAL ALIEN REMOVALS INCREASED, BUT 
TECHNOLOGY PLANNING IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED 14 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-
708. In fiscal year 2011, nearly 80,000 individuals were removed under the program. Id. at 15 tbl.2.   
4 See HOMELAND SEC. ADVISORY COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TASK FORCE ON SECURE 
COMMUNITIES FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 24 (2011) [hereinafter TASK FORCE], available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac-task-force-on-secure-communities.pdf. 
5 Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 160–62 (2013). 
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Several scholars have recently argued that these personal liberty laws serve as historical 
precedent that help justify state noncooperation in programs like Secure Communities.6 This 
scholarship, however, captures only part of the story. Not only can one draw parallels between 
the personal liberty laws and state resistance to Secure Communities, but the causes of such state 
resistance are arguably similar as well.   
Relying on recent historical literature on the Fugitive Slave Act, this Essay argues that state 
resistance in both situations has been caused by an exclusively federal regime that has left no 
policymaking role for the states. Before the federal government occupied the field, many 
northern states enacted policies designed to moderate the harsh procedures of the Fugitive Slave 
Act. If given the opportunity, many states would likely do the same today with respect to 
immigration enforcement. Such state participation would produce better results than the current 
system of state resistance to broken federal law. When reviewing its enforcement policy, the 
Obama Administration therefore should consider giving the states greater flexibility to control 
the implementation of Secure Communities. 
This Essay proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly canvasses the history of fugitive slave 
rendition. Part II provides greater detail on the Secure Communities program and state responses 
thereto. Part III elaborates on how the nation’s experience with fugitive slaves can inform 
modern immigration enforcement.   
 
I.  FUGITIVE SLAVE RENDITION 	  
The Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution prohibited northern states from freeing slaves 
that escaped into their territory. This Clause provided that fugitive slaves “shall be delivered up 
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.” 7 Although the Clause does 
not contain an explicit grant of legislative power, Congress enacted the Fugitive Slave Act in 
1793.8 This Act authorized a southern claimant “to seize or arrest” a fugitive and bring the 
alleged slave before a state or federal judge or magistrate.9 After proving “to the satisfaction of 
such judge or magistrate” that the person claimed was a fugitive slave, the southern claimant 
would receive a certificate authorizing the removal of the fugitive from the state.10 This federal 
Act, however, did not explicitly require the owner to use such legal procedures or provide 
penalties for false claims.  
Northern congressmen thus sought to pass federal legislation to prevent the kidnapping of 
free-black residents under the guise of fugitive slave rendition. 11  Such proposals were 
unsuccessful, however, due to opposition from southerners who did not see kidnapping as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See generally Lasch, supra note 5; Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: 
Exploring Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921 (2012); Craig B. Mousin, A Clear View from the Prairie: 
Harold Washington and the People of Illinois Respond to Federal Encroachment of Human Rights, 29 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
285 (2005); James A. Kraehenbuehl, Note, Lessons from the Past: How the Antebellum Fugitive Slave Debate 
Informs State Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1465 (2011). 
7 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
8 Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793) (repealed 1864). 
9 Id. § 3.  
10 Id. 
11 See 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 829–30 (1818). 
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serious concern.12 In fact, southerners unsuccessfully pushed for amendments designed to 
strengthen the Fugitive Slave Act,13 but sectional differences prevented Congress from reaching 
an agreement on any changes. 
Many state governments therefore filled this void by passing statutes designed to prevent the 
kidnapping of free black residents.14 Under this cooperative system, federal law governed the 
rendition of fugitive slaves, whereas state law punished the unlawful kidnapping of black 
residents. As historian H. Robert Baker has recently argued, the distinction between fugitive 
rendition and protection from kidnapping “was artificial, but it worked.”15 The distinction was 
artificial because both regimes involved an initial determination of whether the claimed 
individual was in fact a fugitive slave. However, the system worked because both regimes were 
enforced by state judges and magistrates.16 In a typical case, the state judge could use state 
procedures to determine if the claimed individual was a fugitive slave and, if appropriate, use 
federal procedures to remand the fugitive to the South.17 Although this system may have angered 
some in each section who disagreed with rendition or who wished to avoid the use of northern 
procedures, in practice, the system was relatively successful.18 
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, however, the Supreme Court essentially declared that this system 
of federal–state cooperation was unconstitutional.19 The Court in Prigg held that the Fugitive 
Slave Clause granted Congress the exclusive power to legislate for the return of fugitive slaves.20 
The Court further held that states could not require slave owners to comply with legal procedures 
that would limit or delay “the right of the owner to the immediate possession of the slave.”21 The 
Court therefore invalidated all state legislation designed to give procedural protections to persons 
claimed as fugitive slaves, including the Pennsylvania law before it. 
Unable to moderate the harsh procedures of the federal Fugitive Slave Act, a number of 
northern states passed laws designed to end all state cooperation in fugitive slave rendition.22 
These statutes, known as “personal liberty laws,” barred state judges and law enforcement 
officers from assisting in rendition and prohibited the holding of an alleged fugitive in a state jail. 
In the six years following Prigg, six northern states passed such laws.23 Because few federal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See 6 ANNALS OF CONG. 1734, 1737 (1796); THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:  THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS 
OF THE NORTH: 1780–1861, at 30 (1974). 
13 See H.R. 18, 15th Cong. (1818).  
14 See generally MORRIS, supra note 12. 
15 H. ROBERT BAKER, PRIGG V. PENNSYLVANIA: SLAVERY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE AMBIVALENT 
CONSTITUTION 63 (2012) [hereinafter BAKER, PRIGG]; see also H. Robert Baker, The Fugitive Slave Clause and the 
Antebellum Constitution, 30 LAW & HIST. REV. 1133, 1142–44 (2012). 
16 See BAKER, PRIGG, supra note 15, at 63. 
17 See id. 
18 See id.; STEVEN LUBET, FUGITIVE JUSTICE: RUNAWAYS, RESCUERS, AND SLAVERY ON TRIAL 29–30 (2010).  
19 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
20 Id. at 541–42. In dicta, the Court indicated that states could pass legislation to remove undesirable fugitives under 
their police powers. Id. at 542–43. This dicta became a holding in Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 18 (1852). 
21 Prigg, 41 U.S. at 612. 
22 Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 
25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 21 (1979) (asserting that state personal liberty laws were “the most direct Northern reaction to 
Prigg”). 
23 Massachusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island all passed legislation 
prohibiting state officials from assisting federal rendition. Id. Moreover, Ohio repealed an act, which had required 
state officials to do so, and New York kept its preexisting personal liberty law intact. Id. After the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850 was passed, Ohio, Wisconsin, Maine, and the Minnesota Territory also passed such legislation. Id. 
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officers were available in the states, claimants were usually unable to gain assistance from law 
enforcement. Although slave catchers sometimes took matters into their own hands, local 
sympathies often made recovery impractical. The personal liberty laws therefore virtually 
nullified the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.24   
Southern complaints about northern nullification led to the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act 
of 1850 as part of a sweeping sectional adjustment known as the Compromise of 1850.25 Instead 
of bringing the states back into the policymaking process or attempting to make the process more 
palatable to the North, Congress attempted to empower the federal government to enforce the 
law in the face of northern resistance.26  Congress therefore followed the Supreme Court’s lead 
by federalizing the rendition of fugitive slaves. 
Although the federal government vigorously enforced the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850,27 it 
was widely perceived to be a failure.28 Throughout its short history, states continued to pass 
personal liberty laws and, in some areas, state officials even actively interfered with federal 
enforcement.29 Events like the rendition of Anthony Burns in Boston, which required hundreds 
of soldiers and drew thousands of protestors, illustrated the danger and expense of attempting to 
reclaim fugitive slaves in the face of northern hostility.30 With much of the northern population 
and many state and local governments opposed to the law, effective federal enforcement was 
virtually impossible.   
The nation’s history with fugitive slave rendition can be summarized as follows. In the early 
years, the federal government created the basic rendition framework, and northern states 
effectively tailored enforcement procedures to satisfy the demands of local populations and 
protect black residents. After the Supreme Court and Congress took the states out of the 
policymaking process, however, some state governments ended all cooperation, many 
northerners resisted federal rendition, and, as a result, the exclusively federal enforcement 
regime proved to be divisive and ineffectual. 
 
II. SECURE COMMUNITIES 
 
Although immigration law is generally set by the federal government, ICE relies on state 
cooperation for its Secure Communities program. First launched in 2008, the Secure 
Communities program seeks to focus enforcement resources on immigrants who commit serious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 See id. 
25 Act of Sept. 18, 1850, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850) (repealed 1864). The Compromise of 1850 also addressed 
sectional differences over slavery in the territories, the admission of California as a free state, and the slave trade in 
the nation’s capital. See DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS: 1848–1861, at 99-100 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 
1976). 
26 Most importantly, because many state officers were not cooperating, the Act authorized federal commissioners to 
enforce the law. See Act of Sept. 18, 1850 § 1. 
27 See STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE SLAVE LAW, 1850–1860, at 
150 (1968). 
28 See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONISTS AT BAY, 1776–1854, at 536–37 
(1990). 
29 The most extreme examples occurred in Wisconsin and Ohio. See Jeffrey Schmitt, Rethinking Ableman v. Booth 
and States’ Rights in Wisconsin, 93 VA. L. REV. 1315, 1316, 1350 (2007). 
30 See, e.g., EARL M. MALTZ, FUGITIVE SLAVE ON TRIAL:  THE ANTHONY BURNS CASE AND ABOLITIONIST OUTRAGE 
92–94 (2010). 
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crimes.31 Under this program, state officers send booking information on state prisoners to 
federal officials who determine which prisoners to target for deportation.32  When a state 
prisoner is so targeted, federal officials issue a detainer asking the state to hold the prisoner until 
federal immigration officials take custody.33   
Although direct state involvement in the program is fairly limited, it is easy to understand 
how immigrants confronted with Secure Communities would view local law enforcement as part 
of the federal immigration enforcement regime. ICE officers use information collected by local 
law enforcement to determine whom to target for removal. Many immigrants therefore 
understandably fear that any interaction with local law enforcement officers risks incurring the 
scrutiny of ICE. As a result, such immigrants are less likely to trust local law enforcement and 
report crimes.34 
Because of this effect on local immigrant communities and concerns about racial profiling, 
many states and localities have sought to withdraw from participation in the Secure Communities 
program. 35  California, for example, recently enacted the Trust Act, which ends routine 
compliance with federal requests to enter immigration detainers.36  Such state noncooperation is 
likely constitutional under the Court’s anti-commandeering doctrine, which prohibits the federal 
government from requiring state executive officers to enforce federal law.37 
Some localities have even asked to be excluded from the information sharing system that 
transmits booking information to ICE. Unlike participation in the detainer process, however, the 
states likely have no way to avoid the information sharing aspects of Secure Communities. States 
voluntarily share booking information with the FBI for law enforcement purposes, and, under 
Secure Communities, the FBI merely shares this information with ICE. Because information 
sharing between two federal agencies does not implicate the anti-commandeering doctrine, state 
noncooperation cannot undermine this key aspect of Secure Communities.38 
 
III. LEARNING FROM THE FUGITIVE SLAVE ISSUE 
 
The nation’s experience with fugitive slaves should inform modern debates over immigration 
enforcement. As Christopher Lasch and others have recently noted, the personal liberty laws 
serve as historical precedent for California’s Trust Act and other instances of state 
noncooperation.39 This existing scholarship, however, tells only part of the story. Although the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
32 See Lasch, supra note 5, at 154–55. 
33 See DHS Form I-247, Immigration Detainer – Notice of Action (2012), available at http://www.ice.gov/secure-
communities/pdf/immigration-detainer-form.pdf.   
34 See, e.g., Radha Vishnuvajjala, Note, Insecure Communities: How an Immigration Enforcement Program 
Encourages Battered Women to Stay Silent, 32 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 185, 186 (2012). 
35 Lasch, supra note 5, at 160–62. 
36 See Patrick McGreevy, Signing Trust Act Is Another Illegal-Immigration Milestone for Brown, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 5, 
2013, 7:36 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-brown-immigration-
20131006,0,5441798.story?page=1#axzz2yVmKLU5B.  
37  See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime 
Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1499–1500 (2006). 
38 See TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 13. Professor Kittrie has likewise argued that state policies designed to protect 
immigrants have limited efficacy. See Kittrie, supra note 37, at 1480–84. 
39 See sources cited supra note 6. 
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personal liberty laws may provide a guide for how states can deal with an unjust federal law, it is 
important to recognize that, for many northerners, the personal liberty laws were an imperfect 
solution. Before the Supreme Court intervened in Prigg, many northern states actively 
participated in the fugitive rendition process by giving free blacks procedural protections to 
prevent kidnapping. With Congress unable to reach a compromise, individual states passed 
compromise legislation that satisfied local populations and moderated federal law. It was only 
after the Court removed the states from the policymaking process that many states withdrew 
assistance, ultimately resulting in harsh federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. 
This history suggests that, because Congress is similarly paralyzed in the immigration 
context, the states should be given a greater policymaking role. States can likely make more of a 
difference by helping to moderate enforcement policies and procedures than by leaving the issue 
to ICE officials. 
However, just as the Supreme Court cut states out of the rendition regime for fugitive slaves, 
the Court in Arizona v. United States has cast doubt on whether a state can insert itself into the 
policymaking process for immigration enforcement.40  Arizona involved a challenge to an 
Arizona statute designed to vigorously enforce federal immigration law, even in circumstances in 
which federal officers had decided not to do so. Among other things, the Arizona statute 
criminalized the failure to comply with federal registration requirements, made it illegal for an 
unauthorized alien to seek work, and required state officers to verify the immigration status of 
certain individuals.41 
The Supreme Court broadly held that federal immigration law preempted Arizona’s 
enforcement statute.42 As Justice Scalia explained in his dissent, this was not because the 
Arizona law “excludes those whom federal law would admit, or admits those whom federal law 
would exclude.  It does not purport to do so.”43 Instead, the Court held that Arizona’s strict 
enforcement regime implicitly conflicted with federal enforcement priorities because the state 
targeted individuals whom the federal government would ignore.44 Like Prigg, Arizona appears 
to leave little room for independent state policy.45  
However, because Arizona is based on preemption by federal enforcement policies, the case 
invites President Obama to authorize greater state involvement by changing those policies. The 
President should accept this invitation. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was a draconian 
provision designed to empower federal officers to forcefully return fugitive slaves in the face of 
northern resistance. Rather than repeat this history with unpopular programs run exclusively by 
ICE, the federal government should learn from this failure and give the states a greater voice in 
policy discussions over immigration enforcement. 
Although specific suggestions are beyond the scope of this Essay, a task force on Secure 
Communities formed by the Department of Homeland Security has suggested a few options. The 
task force recognized that, to be successful, ICE must run the Secure Communities “program in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012). 
41 Id. at 2497–98. 
42 Id. at 2510. 
43 Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
44 Id. at 2510 (majority opinion).   
45 Although the states played a large role in shaping immigration law early in U.S. history, see Gerald L. Neuman, 
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1834 (1993), the Supreme 
Court has consistently struck down independent state policy. See Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick 
Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074, 2088 (2013). 
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close cooperation with local communities and police leaders.” 46  For example, the report 
recommends:   
 
ICE should consider expanding to all states the practice it employs in Colorado, where a 
panel of state officials, under the direction of the Governor, crafted an agreement to help 
the state monitor actions under Secure Communities and their impact on state priorities 
under state law. Under the agreement, which ICE accepted, ICE provides the state with 
quarterly reports detailing whether identified individuals have been convicted of crimes 
or are in a noncriminal category of other ICE enforcement priorities.47 
 
The report further recommends establishing a panel of independent representatives of local law 
enforcement and the community to review ICE’s exercise of prosecutorial discretion.48 Finally, 
some members of the task force recommend that the program be suspended until it can be 
reformed to address the concerns of community leaders and local officials.49 The example of 
fugitive slave rendition fully supports the task force’s recommendations for greater state 
involvement. 
At this time, however, ICE is moving in the opposite direction. The Colorado program 
discussed above was part of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with ICE.50  The ICE website 
now states:  “Because ICE has determined that an MOA with a state is not necessary to activate 
or operate Secure Communities for jurisdictions within that state, ICE has decided to terminate 
all existing MOAs.”51 It further provides:  “FACT: State and local jurisdictions cannot opt out of 
Secure Communities.”52 Unfortunately, the federal government is currently forcing states to 
participate in its enforcement regime rather than seeking local cooperation. President Obama 
should change course. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When considering changes to immigration-enforcement policy, the nation’s experience with 
fugitive slave rendition suggests that President Obama should seek greater cooperation with the 
states. In both the immigration and fugitive slave contexts, a polarized Congress was unable to 
pass meaningful compromise legislation to fix a broken federal system. During the early 
nineteenth century, the states therefore moderated federal law with supplemental state procedures 
that made the process more fair and effectual. Until Congress can overhaul our immigration 
system, the states should be permitted to do the same today. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 TASK FORCE, supra note 4, at 29. The report also cautioned that ICE “must be flexible in its implementation of 
any program involving law enforcement agencies to minimize the risk that its goals might undermine those of local 
law enforcement or work against community safety.” Id. at 25. 
47 Id. at 21. 
48 Id. at 27. 
49 Id. at 8, 27–28.   
50 See Memorandum of Agreement between U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., and Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Safety (Jan. 6, 2011), available at 
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities-moa/colorado-sc-moa.pdf. 
51 Secure Communities: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/faq.htm (last visited April 6, 2014). 
52 Secure Communities: Get the Facts, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/get-the-facts.htm (last visited April 6, 2014). 
